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GOVERNING PRIVATE PROPERTY IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF THE TRUST
RELATIONSHIP AND TRUST RESPONSIBILITY ARISING
OUT OF EARLY SUPREME COURT OPINIONS AND THE
GENERAL ALLOTMENT ACT
RICHARD A. MONETTE*
"You own the stars?"
"Yes."
"But I have seen a king who-"
"Kings do not own, they reign over. It is a very different matter."**
INTRODUCTION
Indian Tribes should not own title to property. Why not? Because
individuals own title to property; sovereigns hold dominion over territory.
Individuals are subject to sovereigns; property is a subset of territory.
Sovereigns issue patents to title; individuals merely convey title by deed.
Sovereigns "take" title by eminent domain; individuals can do no such
thing. Should Indian Tribes own title to property? Or should they hold
territorial dominion over it?
Quite likely the reader's reaction to this article's first sentence was
that an anti-Indian polemic was sure to follow. However, the prevailing
perception that Tribes "own title" does more harm than good to their
cause. United States jurisprudence treats Indian Tribes more like individual
landowners under an existing property system rather than as sovereigns
with dominion to create and control their own property systems. Many,
if not most, of the Tribes' practical problems today arise where sovereignty, territory, and property intersect.
Part I of this article will provide the relevant background of territory
and property in the U.S. law and prolitics. Part II will provide the relevant
federal Indian law background. Part III will examine several current
scenarios which illustrate the confusion between ownership and control
of property in Indian law and the tension between the political-based
"Trust Relationship" and property-based "Trust Responsibility."
PART I:

OF POLITICS, TERRITORY, AND PROPERTY

The interplay of political theory with notions of territory and property
plays a peculiar role in the relationship between the United States and
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**
ANTOINE DE SAINT-ExUPtRY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 55 (Katherine Woods trans., 1943).
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Indian Tribes. This section will study these ideas as they relate to the
development of federal Indian law. It will conclude with a preliminary
explanation of the problems that arise when American political theory
and laws are inconsistently imposed on unsuspecting Indian Tribes.
A.

Of Politics
In The Morality of Consent, Professor Alexander Bickel wrote, "Two
divergent traditions in the mainstream of Western political thought-one
'liberal,' the other 'conservative'-have competed, and still compete, for
control of the democratic process and of the American constitutional
system; both have controlled the direction of our judicial policy at one
time or another."' Bickel's thesis has been amply illustrated throughout
American history in debates between Federalist and Anti-Federalist, liberal
and conservative, Democrat and Republican. 2 Indeed, the idea has had
a profound impact on the development of federal Indian law and scholarship.
America's founding debates best exemplify these divergent political
theories. Thomas Paine, among others, argued that logically people must
have preceded government and therefore are the source of all its authority;
thus, if the people have not authorized their government to act, it may
not act.' Conversely, Charles Pinckney and others argued that government
was necessarily formed out of evolving and shifting exigencies of geography, economy, and culture so that the state must precede its citizenry.
They argued that the state has inherent powers to act first without its
subjects' prior authority, justifying the act morally and politically upon
their subsequent consent. 4 These notions have evolved into ideas of
individual libertarianism versus state police powers, both of which play
a critical role in the relationship of governments to their subjects when
it comes to private property.' They have also come to reveal the greatest
6
legal and political questions facing Tribes today.
The founders of the Union realized that two sovereign spheres could
not overlap or one would certainly destroy the other. They knew that
if two overlapped, "contests respecting power must arise.'" 7 How then
to ensure that one sovereign was not entirely usurped by the supremacy
of the other?
Their answer was relatively simple: they would limit the sphere of
influence of the sovereign with supremacy. One sovereign would be the
grantee and the other the grantor in the exchange of sovereign power.

1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3 (1975).
2. See generally, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION (Herbert

Storing ed., 1985) [hereinafter

ANTI-FEDERALISTI.

3. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 81-82 (Citadel Press, Inc. 1974) (1794).
4. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 4-25.

5. For example, witness the renewed national debate in the land-use context where the Union
and States exercise regulatory police powers to the point of "taking" private property.
6. The Supreme Court set forth a "police powers" test in determining Tribal jurisdiction in
many instances. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
7. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 205 (1824).
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The grantee's sovereignty would be supreme but its sovereign sphere
would be limited, so that the grantor's sovereignty, while subordinate in
certain areas, would be inherent and vastly broader. Thus, neither would
"triumph in the fullness of dominion over the other." 8 Coupled with
the principle that the souice of governing power was the people, the
government which was closer to the people, the States, would be the
grantor with inherency in an unlimited sphere and the Union would be
the grantee with supremacy in a limited sphere. 9 This logic became
embodied in the Tenth Amendment as the cornerstone of the Union/
State relationship: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."' 1
This divergence made its way into United States laws and politics
dealing with Indian Tribes, particularly over the issue of which level of
government would deal with Tribes. Conflicts between States and Tribes,
just as between two States, are ultimately resolved by the federal government. As a result, States have a tendency to view their conflicts with
Tribes as a conflict between themselves and the federal government. This
viewpoint reflects a States-oriented perspective, which in turn serves to
ultimately defeat the Tribes." In actuality, Tribes are in a similar position
to States in our federal system, giving rise to tensions between a central
government and local sovereigns, with all the attendant social and political
concerns.

12

Exacerbating matters, Indian law matured under the liberal, pro-federal
government Warren Court of the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, Tribes
have tended to tailor their arguments to reflect those used effectively in
an era featuring the expansion of big government and civil rights. Both
of these areas of growth whittled away at the sovereignty of the States.
Today, however, those same arguments have been less effective for Tribes
before the more conservative, States-oriented Rehnquist Court. Consequently, the divergent political theories discussed above have recently
reemerged to impact how American law treats Tribes. If Tribes are to
emerge from the Rehnquist era with their sovereign integrity intact, they
must re-configure their legal and political thinking to address the political
theories of the Rehnquist Court. In particular, the term "States' rights"
must be tantamount to "Tribes' rights," thus invoking the same notions
of republican democracy and federalism.
B.

Of Territory
Territory is a cornerstone of sovereignty. It is a prerequisite for political
recognition as an independent and autonomous "state."' 3 A hallmark of
8. ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 211.
9. See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11. SYDNEY L. HARRING, CRow DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND
UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 25 (1994).

12. Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the
United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 TOL. L. REV.
617 (1994).
13. MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (6th ed. 1987).

38
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American federalism, or at least of the more conservative of our divergent
traditions, is that the original thirteen American States preceded the
Union as independent states with inviolable spheres of territorial sovereignty. Thus, the Tenth Amendment's reserved rights logic protects the
States' territorial integrity within the Union.
Nonetheless, State sovereignty has become "permeable" in certain regards where, by express grant in the Fourteenth Amendment, state governments have become constrained by the federal Bill of Rights and
various federal statutes. Perhaps the greatest permeation of the States'
sovereignty rests in the expansive reading of the grant of regulatory
powers to the Union in the Commerce Clause, including States' inherent
sovereign powers to regulate commerce with Indian Tribes. 14 Nevertheless,
the Tenth Amendment ensures that States maintain a high degree of
territorial integrity.
Like the original thirteen States of the Union, Tribes were once independent "states" with complete territorial sovereignty. 5 Today, as the
U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, "[T]ribes can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense."1 6 However, "[tihe Court has repeatedly
emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to tribal
sovereignty.' ' 1 7 Of course, the Tribes' loss of some territorial sovereignty
can be attributed to mutual agreements in treaties. Nevertheless, even
when the Tribes ceded territory they reserved for themselves another
degree of territorial sovereignty. 8 Indeed, in the criminal law context,
the U.S. Congress has taken account of the territorial nature of the
Tribes' existence through a statute defining "Indian Country."1 9 The U.S.20
Supreme Court has used the criminal statute as a guide in civil matters.
The question, then, is whether Tribes have enough reserved territorial
sovereignty to maintain their own property systems. If not, how does
the United States justify such an epic change of circumstances for Tribes?
More practically, what will be the long-term effects on Tribes and their
peoples, economies, and cultures?
C. Of Property
The American property system is largely an outgrowth of the English
property system. Early political debates on property queried whether all
territory should be held communally or divided in severalty, giving life

14. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("[Congress shall have power] to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes").
15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) ("The acts of our government
plainly recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts.").
16. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978)).
17. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980).
18. Tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556 (1975) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
557 (1832)). See also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 256, nn.114 & 115
(Strickland ed., 1982).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
20. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
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to such familiar notions as land barons, "levellers and diggers," and the
"tragedy of the commons. ' 2' In the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
22
Constitution, private property became the subject of a basic civil right.
Today's debates tend to oscillate between varying degrees of rights and
restrictions attaching to private property, pitting state "police power"
against libertarian notions of governmental restraint. These same notions
tend to pervade the evolution of Tribes, their territory, and their property
23
law.
Perhaps the greatest utility of the Anglo-American property system is
its ability to generate revenue for government, usually in the form of
taxes and fees. Property is taxed, transactions and transfers are taxed,
uses are licensed, deeds and title searches are costly, the price of an
abstract is high, and so on. Indeed, in such areas as land use, the property
system is often used to manipulate economic activity according to geographics, demographics, and other factors. From the Statute of Uses 24
to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 2s the Anglo-American property system
has provided the playing field for governments to impose various taxes
and fees on property in the name of generating revenue for good government. Even though Indian Tribes are constitutionally recognized governments with a degree of political sovereignty over territory and a greater
degree of popular sovereignty over their subjects who own property within
that territory, they find it increasingly difficult to benefit from any of
these revenue generating methods.
D. The Problem
In the property arena, as in any area of Indian law, the overarching
problem is that Tribes have been subsumed into the U.S. federal system
in an unclear and disorderly fashion, arguably without their authority
and certainly without a mechanism to ensure their continued consent. 26

21. See generally, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (Bruce A. Ackerman ed.) (1975).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
23. See e.g., a land-use dispute involving hazardous sludge in and around the Torres-Martinez
Tribe reported in the Los Angeles Times. Tom Garmon, Neighbors Blockade Sludge Mountain,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at BI, B4. A Tribe spokesperson reflected the essence of the "police
power": "[lIndividual freedom can only stretch so far before the tribe must step in." In response,
one Tribe citizen reiterated the essential libertarian argument against police power: "[N]obody can
interfere with our right to do with it [property] what we want. Some of us are worried that if the
tribe can stop one individual from operating a business, what's to stop them from preventing others
from doing the same? We treasure that freedom." Unfortunately, the citizen relied on the direct
Trust Responsibility between the U.S. government and allotments, saying, "These allotments were
given out by the (federal Bureau of Indian Affairs) to individual tribal members ...." In other
words, the Tribe citizen would infringe her own Tribe's sovereignty by appealing to another sovereign
rather than using her own sovereign's political processes. Federal courts, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and other federal agencies are often all too happy to accommodate her.
24. See JAMES L. WINOKER, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 183-84 (1982).
25. See id. at 196-201.
26. Richard Monette, A New Federalismfor Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 TOL. L. REv. 617,
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The federal exercise over Indian property speaks volumes about the
morality of imposing laws without authority or consent. But the problem
is by no means solely an Indian issue. The federal government has spent
countless hours, money, and energy attempting to deal with the problem.
It is the American taxpayer who foots the bill.
In 1887, the U.S. government enacted the General Allotment Act
(GAA), 27 setting the stage for legal battles over Tribes' territory and
property that continues to the present. The first section of the GAA
authorized the President to survey Tribe territories and divide them into
"allotments" for individual Tribe citizens. 28 Section 4 authorized Indians
not residing on a reservation to select an allotment upon the public
domain. 29 The fifth section imposed restrictions on alienation by providing

that title to allotments be held "in trust for the sole use and benefit of
the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made .. . and that
at the expiration of said period the United States will convey the same
by patent to said Indian, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all
charge or incumbrance whatsoever." 30 Section 5 also included a proviso
applying the laws of the State to descent and partition of allotted lands.3
Section 6 subjected allottees to the civil or criminal laws of the surrounding
or adjacent State or territory, including, presumably, property laws.3 2
However, in 1906, the Burke Act delayed application of State laws until
expiration of the trust period.33
Significantly, the GAA merely provided for the application of State
laws, not for State jurisdiction.3 4 Certainly, the federal government, or
perhaps the Tribe itself, has the jurisdiction to apply State laws.3 5 Even

628 (1994). See also Milner Ball, Constitution, Courts, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 1; Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, 'States, and the Federal Courts, 56 CHI
L. REV. 671 (1989); Richard Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV.
365 (1989).
27. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-42,
348-49, 354, 381 (1988)).
28. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406"U.S. 128, 142 (1972) ("Allotment is a term
of art in Indian law .... It means a selection of specific land awarded to an individual allottee
from a common holding" (citations omitted)).
29. General Allotment Act, supra note 27, at 389 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 334
(1988)).
30. Id. (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988)).
31. Id.
32. Id. (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
33. Ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 325 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
34. This conclusion finds precedent in the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988),
which, as one court held, authorizes federal authorities to apply State law in Indian country. Pueblo
of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1987). Although the Court's application of
the ACA to Indian Country is questionable, its presumption of no state jurisdiction in the absence
of express congressional delegation is accurate, even though State substantive law is applied. Comment,
Indian Country Jurisdiction and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 69 OR. L. REv. 269 (1990). See also
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (finding that the state has
no jurisdiction where Organized Crime Control Act adapts state law for federal jurisdiction).
Unfortunately, some treatises seem to affirm some haphazard lower court decisions finding state
jurisdiction. See, e.g.,COHEN, supra note 18, at 134.
35. This notion that jurisdiction over allotments were to remain under the federal government
as opposed to the State also finds some support in Section 4 of the GAA which provides that
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if the GAA did provide for application of State laws or State jurisdiction,
the GAA did not expressly preempt the application of Tribe laws and
Tribe jurisdiction. Because the federal government has never been in the
business of maintaining property systems, and because individual Indians
generally had no knowledge of State laws, federal administration of
allotted lands became problematic. As a result, Congress has enacted
various exceptions to the restrictions on alienation, such as shortening
the trust period, allowing "competent" Indians to sell land, issuing fee
patents to competent heirs of allottees who died during the trust period,
authorizing the sale of a non-competent allottee's lands as long as the
revenue benefitted the allottee,3 6 and allowing leasing for mining and
grazing.3 7 The fallout has been immeasurable.
The Tribes' loss of land is itself unfathomable. Land within the territory
and under the jurisdiction of Tribes decreased from approximately 156
million acres in 1881 to 78 million acres by 1900 and to 48 million acres
by 1934.1 8 An even more significant problem hovering heavily over Tribes
today is the problem of fractionation of Indian trust lands. Although
the federal government is statutorily authorized to lease lands for various
reasons, the Tribe itself or an individual citizen of the Tribe, acting on
entrepreneurial initiative, must first attain assent from every individual
with an interest in the parcel (which may number- in the hundreds), and
then from the federal government. Even when the federal government
administers the property, the problems are unwieldy at best.
The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) is charged with administering
the trust, but, as its own internal communication reveals: "[firactionated
Heirship has reached the point where a significant number of tracts are
so highly fractionated that the land has become unusable or is of little
value to the interest holder." 3 9 The DOI continued: "The fractionated
ownership of Indian lands is taxing the ability of the government to
administer and maintain ownership records on Indian lands and threatens
the integrity and viability of the Department's Trust Fund Management
System. '" 40 A magazine article similarly noted that "[tihe [DOI trust]

allotments for on-reservation Indians were to be recorded in the federal "General Land Office,"
which remain to this day under federal control, while public domain allotments for off-reservation
Indians were to be administered through and recorded in the "local land office," which subsequently
were subsumed under State property systems. General Allotment Act, supra note 27.
36. The general rule seems to be that, as trustee, the United States may substitute one form
of trust asset for another as long as their respective values is similar. See, e.g., Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (holding that
Congress, where giving land to white settlers and giving Indians full money value, is exercising not
eminent domain but trust duty).
37. See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1910, Ch. 431, 36 Stat. 855 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1853, 1856; 25 U.S.C. §§ 47, 151, 202, 312 (1988)).
38. COHEN, supra note 18, at 138 (citing D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF
INDIAN LANDS (F. Prucha ed., 1973)).
39. Briefing Paper prepared by Larry Morrin, Bureau of Indian Affairs, for Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary of the Interior. (Jan. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
40. Ad. The question becomes one of "Trust Funds" because subsequent federal statutes essentially
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fund records ownership of land parcels as small as seven inches by seven
inches, monitors transactions in fractions of a penny and sends out
dividend checks as small as $1.38. "41 In response, Congress has recently
directed DOI to reform the accounting system for funds derived from
allotted lands. 42 But neither branch seems inclined to get to the core of
the problem: why is the Tribe not recognized as the governing authority
over such matters?
Like any local sovereign, Tribes attempt to create and develop their
own property systems but are increasingly thwarted. As a result of early
case law and the General Allotment Act, property in the hands of Indians
or Tribes tends to fall within the rubric of two property concepts in the
Anglo-American system-"fee" or "trust." Questions regarding which
sovereign possesses authority over each type of property have become
paramount.
The "fee" concept derives from the Anglo-American property system. 4 3
In Indian Country, fee ownership of property is generally deemed to
vest the owner with the same "bundle of rights" attaching to property
in the Anglo-American system. These rights include the right of alienation
by conveyance, devise or otherwise. The "trust" concept also derives
from Anglo-American property concepts. In property law, a trust exists
when one person possesses property in which another person holds a
vested legal interest. One common scenario involves one capable person
and one incapable person, the former being the guardian and the latter
being the ward. The components necessary to comprise a "trust" include
44
a "corpus" or "res," a "trustee" and a "beneficiary."
The trust concept, however, is far more complicated because it also
encompasses an abstract political concept in the American system. The
political concept evolved to guide government-to-government relationships
between political entities in the international arena, as nation-states became
highly defined by territory, peoples, and interests. American federalism
is an outgrowth of that development .4 5 The political concept of "trust"
crept into Indian law early in the nineteenth century, when the Supreme
Court declared that treaties with Tribes made them into "domestic de-

require the Secretary of the Interior to manage the forests, sell the timber, pay the proceeds of
such sales to the allottees. See e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 162a, 318a, 323-325, 406-407, 466 (1988). Because
the fractionation of allotted lands through heirship is itself unmanageable, the resulting trust funds
have become unmanageable as well. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41. Michael Satchell & David Bowermaster, The Worst Federal Agency: Critics Call the Bureau
of Indian Affairs a National Disgrace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 28, 1994, at 61, 64.
42. Pub. L. 1103-412, 108 Stat. 4239 (1994).
43. The fee or "fee simple" represents a "tenure" or "estate" in real property which determines
who owns it now and perhaps in the future, for how long, what can be done with it, etc.
44. THOMAS L. WATERBURY, MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND ESTATES 60 (West, 1986).
45. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 415 (1965) ("When the
men of 1787 spoke . . 'federal' was still commonly used in a sense close to its Latin origin (foedus,
treaty) to describe a relationship resting in good faith (foedus in Latin was a cognate of fides,
faith).").
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pendent nations" whose relationship with the United States "resembles
that of a ward to its guardians." 46 This distinction was made by the
Court in order to ensure the Tribes' self-governance while keeping the
Tribe subject to the overriding power of the United States. 47 Thus, a
political relationship of48 "trust" developed which has come to be called
the Trust Relationship.
The property concept of "trust" crept into Indian law early in the
twentieth century when the United States invoked the Trust Relationship's
nebulous powers and enacted the General Allotment Act of 1887. 49 Suddenly, in the context of the "guardian/ward" relationship, the allotted
lands looked decidedly like the "res" of a property "trust," the Tribes'
members resembled "beneficiaries," while the responsibilities and the
attendant power inured to the United States as "trustee." Thus, as a
subset of the political relationship, the property concept of "trust"
emerging out of the General Allotment Act developed as the Trust
Responsibility. 0
As a result, an inherent tension has developed between the political
concept of the Trust Relationship and the property concept of the Trust
Responsibility." As do all sovereigns, Tribes attempt to regulate private
property uses within their territories, potentially limiting property values
to the point of a "taking." Indeed, many Tribes have acquired authority
to regulate private property from their own members via their own Tribal
constitutions, including from those members who own allotments.12 And
of course, Anglo-American law presumes such power even without express

46. Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
L. REV. 1213 (1975).
47. Id. Some scholars, in line with their more liberal, race-based analysis of Indian law, have
attributed the trust concepts to less lofty ideals. See, Milner Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 63. Note that even the Chambers article's title speaks only in terms
of a responsibility owed to individual Indians rather than to Tribes, where the political trust
relationship obtains. See Chambers, supra note 46, at 1213.
48. Although not the point of this article, I have written elsewhere that treaties created a
federalism relationship between the Union and Tribes. Monette, supra note 26. As historian Samuel
Beer wrote: "When (Madison] called this method foederal, his meaning in the context can only be
understood in the then conventional sense of foedus, or treaty, given it by the concept of compact
federalism." SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
315 (1993).
49. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
50. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
51. "The trust relationship has been the source of two opposing visions, one emphasizing federal
power, the other emphasizing federal responsibility." AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
249 (Robert Clinton et al. eds., 1991).
52. See e.g., CONSTITUTION OF TME HO-CMUNK NATION, art. V, § 2, cl. (n)-(p). The Legislature
shall have the power:
(n) To purchase under condemnation proceedings any lands within the jurisdiction
of the Ho-Chunk Nation;
(o) To enact laws to regulate and zone any lands within the jurisdiction of the
Ho-Chunk Nation;
(p) To enact laws to create and regulate a system of property including but not
limited to use, title, deed, estate inheritance, transfer, conveyance, and devise.
27 STAN.
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authority from the people as an exercise of valid police power. 3 Nevertheless, the Tribes' attempt to exercise these powers are met with great
resistance.
Much of the resistance comes from the trustee, the U.S. government.
The responsibility of a trustee is to protect the property, or at least to
ensure that fair value is received for it.4 Indeed, in the U.S./Indian
context, the Supreme Court once declared that under certain statutes the
United States must abide by the "most exacting fiduciary standards." 55
A Tribe's own government may impact upon trust allotments and other
trust lands. As a result, the United States' Trust Responsibility over
allotments and other private property may come into apparent conflict
with theTribe's sovereign power over both the property and its members.
Even though the Trust Relationship seems to recognize the Tribe's selfgoverning political integrity in such matters, the Trust Responsibility
becomes a two-pronged wedge, one dividing the United States and the
Tribes in their government-to-government relationship and the other dividing the Tribes and their own members. In the end, the Tribes' ability
to exercise territorial governance over their property and their members
is stifled and democratic notions of self-governance are subverted.
Many entities are responsible for the problems faced by today's Tribes
in dealing with their own property. Congress initially caused the conflict
and continues to play a role. Many different departments in the federal
government handle property issues within Indian Country. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) manages the lands and the funds accrued from
those lands, while the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Bureau
of Reclamation (BR) attempt to apply their legal authorities and laws
within a Tribe's territory. The DOI's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
attempts to apply all its conservation laws within the Tribes' territory,
which raises some of the same questions litigated by States and their
citizens regarding restrictions on private property. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) attempts to resolve these internal conflicts between federal
agencies, but often sides against the Tribes, leaving wide gaps in the
understanding of the Trust Relationship and the federal government's
Trust Responsibility.
Powerful environmental lobbies side with Tribes when non-Indians
would exploit their property within a Tribes' territory, and yet side against
Tribes when a Tribe or its members would try to exploit tribal property

53. See, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 145, (Johnson, J., concurring). For further
explanation of the pre-consent police powers of states, see California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary
Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
54. See, e.g., Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(noting that the fiduciary duty of United States includes the "obligation to maximize trust income
by prudent investment"). See also Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States,
9 Cl. Ct. 660 (1986).
55. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
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for reasons of survival. Often Tribes and their own members are at odds
over such matters. Buoyed by court decisions, non-Indian property owners
within Tribe boundaries often refuse to abide by tribal laws. This blatant
refusal comes even though American law recognizes in States and their
subdivisions the inherent territorial nature of certain legal matters such
6
as land-use planning.1
To make matters worse, because the States tend to see their conflicts
with Tribes more as conflicts with the federal government,57 when they
argue against the federal government's authority over property in Indian
Country they concomitantly argue that any such authority ought to accrue
to them. Unfortunately, the courts have often agreed. The result: once
a parcel of real property within a Tribe's territory vests in private hands,
the legal system, from administrative agencies to the Supreme Court, has
suggested that the property falls under State governance and may no
longer be governed by the Tribe.5" An indication of this trend is the
changing discourse from the statutory Indian Country definition towards
the recently fabricated misnomer "Indian lands." 5 9
Therefore, when Tribe members hold property privately in trust, Tribes
increasingly lose sovereignty to the federal government. 60 When they hold
property in fee they lose sovereignty to the States which proceed to tax
and otherwise attempt to regulate the property. 6 This phenomenon results
from the persisting perception that Tribes and Indians cannot establish
and control their own property systems. 62 Meanwhile, Tribes lose much

56. See generally, Brendale v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989).
57. See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 13 (Spaeth et al. eds., 1993) (hereinafter
DESKBOOK] ("Removal was deemed necessary .. . because of increasingly bitter federal-state jurisdiction conflicts related to Indian lands."). See also, FRANCIs PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER
195-200 (1984).
58. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
59. See e.g., Breslin, Addressing Environmental Problems on Indian Lands: Issues of Tribal
Sovereignty Versus State and EPA Regulatory Authority, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1920 (1989).
60. See, e.g., cases and developments involving 25 U.S.C. § 410. The problem which the Act
addressed arose when several States provided social assistance to elderly Tribe members. Upon the
Tribe member's death those States requested and the Department of the Interior reimbursed the
States out of moneys from the individual's trust account which had accrued from leasing their
allotted lands, without attaining consent of heirs. Congress recognized the inequity and reinstated
the deceased Tribe member's money, but the heirs have been difficult if not impossible to find.
The issue becomes to which government should the unclaimed money escheat-the Tribe or the
federal government? If the States were a party the money would certainly escheat to the citizen's
State. See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
61. See Brendale, 492 U.S. 408. For an interesting twist, see Pease v. Yellowstone County, 21
Indian L. Rep. 6109 (Crow Ct. App., June 24, 1994) (Tribe court ruled that county lacks authority
to tax Tribe citizen's land allotted under Crow Allotment Act, 41 Stat. 751, even the land is no
longer in restricted trust status.).
62. In a rather biased "treatise," the Conference of Western Attorneys General (CWAG) exemplifies the propagation of this notion: "The 1790 Act prohibited . . . tribal members from selling
their lands .... Farther down the page the CWAG again writes: "The Act of June 30, 1834
... prohibited alienation of lands by tribes .... In fact, the Act prohibited States and their
citizens from governing or buying it. DESKBOOK, supra note 57 at 10-11.
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needed revenue. Tribes lose territory when courts construe the heavy loss
of land on reservations as a diminishment of the reservation boundaries
or an extinguishment of tribal property rights altogether. Environmental
degradation goes unchecked. The Tribes' cultural patrimony is lost. Their
democratic political processes and relationships regarding their citizens
and their governments go unexercised. Economic development is stifled.
From intestate death to intestate death, child by child, acre by acre,
blood degree by blood degree, the current system ensures that Tribes,
their members, and their sovereignty spiral toward a slow but sure death.
Not surprisingly, then, the Anglo-American property system is perceived
as the mortal enemy of Tribes, rather than as a tool to be borrowed
by Tribes and used to maintain their sovereignty as other sovereigns do.
PART II: FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES/TRIBE
RELATIONSHIP AND A SUMMARY BACKGROUND OF
"FEDERAL INDIAN LAW"
The Quest for Territory: Monopolizing the Preemptive Right of
Discovery
The history of America in regard to territory and property is one of
monbpolization of control over the process of acquiring and redistributing
tribal territory. The Spanish conducted the first debates on the legal and
political integrity of the Tribe's territory, and first recognized that con63
trolling the acquisition of land required control of the parties involved.
This notion became embodied in the concept of "discovery," whereby
the European state first making a claim to a particular territory held the
preemptive right of acquisition against all other European states.6 As
Thomas Jefferson wrote:
I considered our right of preemption of the Indian lands not as
amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment
of a present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of
preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our

A.

expectancy. 65

Typically, the colonies implemented their mother countries' discovery
rights. As the Cohen Handbook explains:
In 1633 the Massachusetts Bay Colony centralized land acquisition.
Individuals were prohibited from treating with Indians for the purchase

63. FRANCISCI DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI REFLECTIONES (1557) (Ernest Nys, ed.
& J. Bate, trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1917) ("Another possible title is by true and
voluntary choice, as if the Indians, aware alike of the prudent administration and the humanity of
the Spaniards, were of their own motion, both rulers and ruled, to accept the King of Spain as
their sovereign.").
64. See generally, Friedrich August Freihen Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation
and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 448 (1935).
65. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 140-41 (1962).
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of land without prior government authorization. By the middle of
the eighteenth century ten colonies had enacted similar laws. From
an early date, then, colonial governments exercised a virtual monopoly
in treating with the Indians.6
After the French and Indian War, the British issued King George III's
Proclamation of 1763, which was an attempt to demarcate European
territory and monopolize discovery rights to acquire territory. 67 This act
helped precipitate the American Revolution. 68 After the American colonies
emerged victorious from the Revolution, they proceeded to acquire land
as successors in interest to England's discovery rights. 69 In the Articles
of Confederation, the new independent States authorized their new union
to acquire territory, but refused to relinquish their own power to do so.
This non-relinquishment led to disputes between States and their citizens
over the disorderly acquisition of territory. 70 As a result, when the U.S.
Constitution was ordained in 1789, the Commerce Clause expressly granted
governing authority to the Union over dealings with Tribes, without
expressly reserving the same authority concurrently in the States.
Pursuant to its express grant of authority, the 1st Congress enacted
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 (the "Act"). The Act prohibited
States and their citizens from acquiring territory from Tribes, following
the well-established trend of invoking governmental powers to monopolize
the acquisition of territory. 7' The intent was to allow the federal government to effectuate an orderly acquisition of tribal territory. Therefore,
history reveals that all interested sovereigns-the Spanish, the British
Crown, the colonies, the original thirteen States, and the Union-were
concerned with not merely the acquisition itself, but also with the monopolization of the acquisition and redistribution of territory.
As the divergent political traditions of western thought came to roost
in the conflict between the Union and the States, the U.S. Supreme Court
oscillated with the prevailing political winds until the issues of acquisition
and redistribution came to a head. As a result, the term "discovery"
itself began to assume divergent meanings in the early caselaw. While
one version reiterated the mere preemptive right, the other expanded the
right so vastly as to amount to "ultimate dominion" over the discovered
territory. This latter meaning germinated the notion that Tribes have no
power to establish their own property systems and control conveyances

66. COHEN, supra note 18, at 57 (citations omitted).
67. See PRUCHA, supra note 65, at 13-20.
68. Id.
69. Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693 (N.Y. Ct. of Errs. 1823).
70. See generally Robert N. Clinton & Margaret Tobey Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME.
L. REV. 17, 36 (1979); Comment, Indian Land Claims Under the Non-Intercourse Act, 44 ALB. L.
REV. 110, 115-16 (1979).
71. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
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of land in their territories.7 2 The former comports with notions of a
republican democracy while recognizing both territorial and popular sovereignty; the latter smacks of pure brute power and tyranny. In an
opinion written near his death, Justice Marshall finally chose the former,
but the latter apparently has found a permanent home in American
jurisprudence.
Early Cases in Federal Indian Law
Four Supreme Court cases decided in the first fifty years of the nation's
history provide a cornerstone for any study of Indian law. These cases
illustrate how this nation's divergent traditions affected the Supreme
Court's Indian law jurisprudence. They also illustrate how subsequent
courts and academicians have interpreted these cases most conveniently
to suit their needs, most often to the Tribes' detriment. Consequently,
the early cases also illustrate how subsequent case law and the academic
community has often mischaracterized the law. Ironically, while three
cases widely known in the field as the "Marshall Trilogy" have received
most of the attention in cases, textbooks, and treatises, another case,
Fletcher v. Peck,73 is perhaps the most significant to the property context.

B.

1. Fletcher v. Peck
In 1810, the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Marshall, had an opportunity to address the relative rights of the Union,
States, and Tribes to territory and property. Up until that point the
colonists' appetites for land were stimulated by acquisitions of formerly
English-acquired territory. Before long, however, they were venturing into
territory that had never been acquired by England, the colonies, the new
States, or the new United States. In some instances the discovery rights
remained uncertain. Many States held firm to the position that they were
successors to England's discovery rights and thus could deal with Tribes
directly. However, the Union was short on revenue, and land acquisition
and resale was a prosperous venture.
In Fletcher v. Peck, the Georgia Legislature had granted property to
individuals in the western fringes of territory claimed by Georgia (now
comprising the states of Alabama and Mississippi) giving rise to the
infamous Yazzou land frauds. After state elections, the succeeding Georgia
Legislature rescinded those grants. The grantees sued, raising the "Union
versus State" discovery issue, "which, at one time, threatened to shake
opinions
the American confederacy to its foundation. ' 7 4 The Justice's
75
aftershocks.
measurable
some
with
Union
the
leave
would

72. DESKBOOK, supra note 57, at 3 ("The right to occupy was therefore deemed usufructuary
in nature and vested no ownership interest in a tribe that the tribe could alienate.")
73. 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
74. Id. at 142.
75. Primarily, the opinion gained notoriety because the Supreme Court, not wanting for creativity,
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While Marshall ruled that the grantees rightfully owned what the
Georgia legislature had originally granted to them, he failed to elaborate
on exactly what it was that they owned. If Georgia held discovery rights,
at least two possibilities emerged. First, if discovery rights amounted
merely to preemptive rights to acquire, what was granted to them would
have been minimal but with great potential. Conversely, if discovery itself
amounted to de facto dominion over the territory regardless of acquisition,
then the value of the grants was indeed incalculable. If, on the other
hand, the Union held discovery rights, then the grants were nearly worthless. In typical fashion, Chief Justice Marshall donned his tap-dancing
shoes.
Marshall ruled that Tribes had a right to exclusive use and occupancy
of unacquired territory and that neither the State nor its grantees could
maintain an action for ejectment against them. 76 However, Marshall
cryptically concluded his opinion by reopening the primary question.
"Indian title," he concluded, "which is certainly to be respected by all
courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely
repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the State. ' 7 7 In other words,
Georgia had granted an ostensible fee title subject to the perhaps perpetual
exclusive use and occupancy of the Tribes, amounting to very little until
the territory was actually acquired. As a result, the original and most
fundamental questions in Indian law were left to fester. Which entity,
Union or State, held the discovery right? What exactly did that discovery
78
right amount to?
In a separate opinion, Justice Johnson more directly addressed these
critical issues. He declared, "To me it appears that the interests of
Georgia in that land amounted to nothing more than a mere possessibility,
and that her conveyance thereof could operate only as a covenant." ' 79
Nonetheless, Johnson seemed to suggest that the discovery right vested
in the State of Georgia rather than the Union. Encouraged by the

analyzed the legislatures' actions under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 137.
The Court determined that the Contracts Clause not only affected executory contracts but also
executed contracts and that an executed contract was tantamount to a grant. Id. at 123. Therefore,
the legislature's rescission of the grant amounted to an impairment of a contract. Id. at 124.
Marshall should have analyzed the case under the Takings Clause since the original state action
vested property rights and the subsequent state action took them away. See id. However, Marshall
may then have been forced to determine the value of a mere discovery right, whether it amounted
to a preemptive option or actual ownership, an issue he refused to decide in the case. See generally
id.
76. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142.
77. Id. at 142-43.
78. The difference in results illustrates the importance of determining what the discovery right
entails. If the State held discovery rights and if discovery was tantamount to dominion, then the
grantees held full value. If the State held discovery rights but discovery was a mere preemptive
right, then the grantees had to wait until the State acquired the territory so they could vest their
grants. If the Union held discovery rights the grantees would have to wait until a State was established
out of the territory before their State-granted rights could vest. The successor legislature's "taking"
would give rise to widely varying amounts of just compensation. To avoid the question, the Court
ruled that the successor legislature's act amounted to an impairment of a contract.
79. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 146.
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ambiguous conclusion of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion and Justice
Johnson's analysis, it would not be long before Georgia would exercise
her discovery rights again.
In the property context, perhaps the greatest significance of Fletcher
v. Peck rests with a argument rendered by the grantees' attorney. In a
statement reflecting a misconception that, unfortunately, has been often
repeated, counsel stated:
A doubt has been suggested whether this power [in a State to issue
title] extends to lands to which the Indian title has not been extinguished. What is the Indian title? .. .It is not like our tenures; they
have no idea of a title to the soil itself . . . It is not a true and
legal possession . . . It is a right not to be transferred but extinguished 80
This mistaken notion that Indians had no concept of property has been
embraced among modern scholars in Indian law, even among those
advocating for Tribes." l Obviously, as the above quote illustrates,2 this
false notion has made friends among the Tribes' many adversaries.1 Why
many tribal advocates have bought into the idea is uncertain; perhaps
the esoterics of cross-cultural clashes in a i anthropological context is
sexier than the banalities of inter-sovereign relationships in a political
and legal context.83
Unfortunately, while courts generally recognize the imposition of traditional property concepts upon the property of Tribes and their members,
they tend to allow the Union and the States to do the imposing, rather
than recognizing Tribes' rights to maintain their own property systems.
As a result, the notion that Indians had no concept of private property
has been transformed into a perception that Tribes also had no concept
of dominion over territory. But Fletcher's significance goes still further.
The arguments of Georgia's own attorneys reveal that they recognized
the fact that sovereigns deal in territory, and that, accordingly, dealings
with Tribes involved territory and not private property. Georgia's attorney
argued, "[Indian title] is a right regulated by treaties, not by deeds of
conveyance. It depends upon the law of nations, not upon municipal
right. "8 4 This statement refutes the conclusion that Tribes had no rec-

80. Id. at 121.
81. See Robert Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing
and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219.

82. See e.g., United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 592 (1873) (finding that the tribe
may use and occupy its reservation, which includes clearing timber for that purpose, but does not
include cutting and selling timber for market purposes). Treaty negotiators used the idea to avoid
having to achieve full consent of all interested parties. See, e.g., a recital of a treaty negotiation
in Ronald N. Satz, Chippewa Treaty Rights, 79 TRANSACTIONS 1, 37 (1991) ('Your Great Father
will not treat with you as bands, but as a nation' Stuart commented, adding very shrewdly, 'treaties
are often made when whole bands are absent, which could not be but on the principle that all
your lands are common property . .

').

83. This development is a prime candidate for Professor Pommersheim's "Indian law liberalism"

label. See Frank Pommersheim, Making All the Difference: Native American Testimony and the

Black Hills, 69 N.D. L. REV. 337, 338 (1993).
84. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 121.
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ognized territory nor the requisite sovereignty to deal with it. Nevertheless,
Fletcher continues to exemplify how the perpetual false myth has been
used against Tribes. Because the Court refused to resolve this ultimate
dilemma in the case, the confusion between territory and property, dominion and ownership, would lie in waiting for the next Indian law case.
2. Johnson v. McIntosh
In 1823, the Court, again through Chief Justice Marshall, rendered
Johnson v. McIntosh,85 an Indian law case holding the rare distinction
of being included in standard property textbooks for its federalism principles. Coincidentally, this case is where most law students and lawyers
get their first and only glimpse into Indian law. There the case stands
proudly for the proposition that all title stems from the sovereign, in
86
this case the Union.
The case involved two men of Euro-American descent, Mr. Johnson
and Mr. McIntosh, and an Indian Tribe with which the United States
had no prior dealings. In 1773 and 1775, the Tribe received money
directly from Johnson for rights in a parcel of land. Later, the United
States purchased from the same Tribe a large territory which happened
to include Johnson's parcel. The United States then issued a patent to
McIntosh for a parcel which included Johnson's parcel. As a result, both
Johnson and McIntosh believed they owned the same parcel. The Supreme
Court ruled for McIntosh, whose ownership stemmed from the Union,
and against Johnson, whose ownership stemmed from the Tribe. 87 Marshall
held that, vis-a-vis an individual citizen, only the Union could make such
an acquisition from a Tribe.
The decision, however, went beyond the question of which entity
possessed the right of acquisition by discovery in the government-versuscitizen context.8 8 Marshall also attempted to address the issue of the
extent and value of the unexercised discovery right. He did so in a manner
widely divergent from that of de Victoria, the early colonies, the British
Crown, and Thomas Jefferson. Rather than satisfying itself with vesting
in the Union a monopoly in the right of preemption, the opinion germinated the idea that discovery itself amounted to some sort of dominion
over the discovered territory. 89 The Court wrote:
[Though the Tribes are] the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it
according to their own discretion ... their rights to complete sov-

85. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).

86. See id. at 567. See also

CHARLES M. HARR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW

3-16

(1977).

87. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 605.
88. The question would remain unanswered in the Union versus State context only to arise again
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), where Marshall again would dodge the
bullet, and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), where he finally squarely addressed
the issue.
89. For an excellent study of the development of this particular rendition of discovery, see
Williams, supra note 81, at 224.
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ereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that
9°
discovery gave exclusive title to those that made it.
Because of such rhetoric, the case has been sorely mischaracterized as
standing for the proposition that Tribes cannot issue title and that Indians
cannot sell it. 9' Granted, its reasoning flows logically from the sentiment
in Fletcher that Tribes and Indians have no concept of private property.
Indeed, if discovery gives one sovereign the "exclusive right to extinguish
the Indian title," 92 a necessary conclusion is the diminishment of the
other sovereign's right to sell. 93 However, the mischaracterization entirely
misses Chief Justice Marshall's point.
The issue in the case was not whether Tribes could issue title, and the
opinion does not say that they cannot. Rather, it says that Tribes cannot
"dispose of the soil" except to those who made the discovery. An accurate
characterization of the case requires accurate reading of the specific issue
and holding. The issue as stated by Chief Justice Marshall was "whether
this title [issued by a Tribe] can be recognized in the Courts of the
United States?"' 94 To this he concluded emphatically, ". . . the Court is
decidedly of opinion that the plaintiffs do not exhibit a title which can
be sustained in the Courts of the United States." 95
Perhaps an example will be illustrative. In an otherwise remarkable
work of research, Professor Rob Williams exemplifies how modern scholarship has contributed to the mischaracterization. After accurately recognizing that Marshall's framing of the issue confined the analysis of
the rights to "courts of this United States," Williams concluded, "Thus,
Johnson . .. effectively denied American Indian tribes recognizable title
to their ancestral homelands under the domestic law of the United States.' "9
Williams' conclusion is inaccurate. In actuality, Marshall recognized that
the Tribe, being sovereign, can hold and issue title; however, that title
cannot be sustained in the courts of another sovereign with whom it had
no political or legal relationship. These are two entirely different creatures.
To illustrate his point, Marshall explained perhaps the single most important concept in the Indian law property context by stating "[tihe
person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory,

90. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
91. See, e.g., DESKBOOK, supra note 57, at 40.
92. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
93. Of course, this quote, taken out of the context of preceding paragraphs, also misses Marshall's
point that a discovery right carries weight only against other European sovereigns, not against the
Tribes themselves. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573 ("This principle was, that discovery gave title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans,
necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives.") (emphasis added).
94. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall repeated, "The inquiry, therefore,
is, in a great measure, confined to the power of the Indian to give, and of private individuals to
receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of this country." Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 604-05 (emphasis added).
96. Williams, supra note 81, at 254.
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incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased;
holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws.97
To support his position Marshall wrote, "[w]e know of no principle
which can distinguish this case from a grant made to a native Indian,
authorizing him to hold a particular tract of land of severalty. ' ' 98 In
other words, Marshall recognized that tribes hold dominion over territory.
He recognized that tribes possess the sovereign power to issue title in
their territory to their own citizeris, and even to non-Indians. Marshall
simply concluded that if a person held property under a tribe's authority
and the tribe subsequently gave away the encompassing territory to the
United States via treaty, that person's recourse lay with the tribe, not
the United States. 99 Simply, a case between two sovereigns with no political
or legal recognition of each other should be read in light of the statements
on territorial sovereignty raised by Justice Johnson in Fletcher, which
recognized that such a transaction "depends upon the law of natifns." 'JO
Bear in mind a crucial fact in Johnson as distinguished from a corresponding fact in the next two cases: when Mr. Johnson made his
purchase, the United States and the tribe had not yet entered into a
treaty relationship. The next two cases illustrate that treaties are the basis
of the political and legal relationship between the Tribes and the United
States. Therefore, without a treaty, upon what basis would the United
States recognize such a title? The conclusion that tribes cannot give
recognized title in U.S. courts accurately assesses the Court's opinion
regarding unrecognized tribes, which have no political or legal relationship
with the United States. Their issuance of title cannot be sustained in the
courts of the United States because, under the law of Nations, the United
States deals with tribes in terms of territory.

97. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added). Marshall also reiterated the point that discovery
attached to political entities, not individuals. Id. at 595.
98. Id. at 593.
99. Id. at 593-94. As Marshall stated, "[t]hese nations had been at war with the United States,
and had an unquestionable right to annul any grant they had made to American citizens." Id. at
594.
100. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 121. Of course, around the time that Johnson was brewing, while John
Marshall was deciding whether a foreign sovereign could issue a title sustainable in American courts,
and while he was concluding that discovery alone gave the ultimate dominion necessary to issue
such title, Marshall's personal and family fortunes were at stake. Marshall was struggling to purchase
and hold onto legal title to the Fairfax Estate, which the King had chartered to Lord Fairfax and
which neither the King nor Lord Fairfax had purchased from any tribe. In other words, while
Marshall was deciding in favor of McIntosh and against Johnson, he found himself more similarly
situated to Johnson than McIntosh. He was confronted by the perplexing question why a title from
one foreign sovereign, namely England, was sustainable in the courts of this country while a title
from another foreign sovereign, namely the Piankeshaw Tribe, was not. Since Marshall ruled that
discovery gave the discoverer the right to acquire territory by purchase or conquest, he expounded
lengthily on conquest in Johnson more to justify his ownership of the Fairfax Estate than McIntosh's
ownership. Indeed, McIntosh's title was sustainable precisely because the United States had in fact
purchased the territory before issuing his title. Unfortunately the cant of conquest has persisted to
the absolute detriment of tribes and democracy. See LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN
LAW 293-95 (1974). See also Williams, supra note 81, at 253-55.
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But a recognized Tribe stands on decidedly different ground. Although
the discovery doctrine and its progeny have been contorted to mean that
Tribes can not issue title or establish and maintain their own property
systems, a careful examination of the record reveals exactly the opposite.
Therefore, Johnson stands for two propositions. First, any tribe, recognized or not, can give title that is sustainable in its own system or
its own courts. Second, the courts of this country cannot sustain a title
issued by a tribe with no recognized political relationship with the United
States. But can the United States recognize the laws (including property
laws) of a Tribe with which it has a treaty?
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
10
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, ' decided in 1831, Georgia again tested
whether the discovery right to acquire a Tribe's territory rested with the
Union or the individual States. Particularly, Georgia was attempting to
nullify the laws of the Cherokee Nation, presumably including its property
laws. Georgia invoked Marshall's discussion of conquest in Johnson by
attempting to extinguish Cherokee sovereignty and impose Georgia laws
on all Cherokee people and territory. The legal proceedings began in the
Supreme Court with the Cherokee Nation seeking to enjoin Georgia's
actions.10 2 Once again Chief Justice Marshall dodged the issue. Because
Article III granted federal courts the jurisdiction to entertain a suit by
a foreign state against a State, Marshall ruled that the Cherokee Nation
0 3 Rather, Marshall declared, "They
did not constitute a foreign state.
[Tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent
105
nations."' 4 Consequently, federal courts could not entertain the suit.
In the property law context, the most significant portion of the opinion
rests in one sentence. Marshall declared, "[The tribes'] relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." The courts and
the scholarship generally attribute the germination of the political Trust
Relationship to this sentence.1° Moreover, reflective of the attributes of
the usual guardian/ward relationship, the sentence also evokes the property
concept of a fiduciary trust responsibility, even though in 1831 no allotments or trust funds existed. Nevertheless, as a result of this wording

101. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 14.
104. Id. at 17.
105. Id. at 18. Marshall did not decide whether a Tribe could sue a state as a "sister State,"
a question only decided in the negative in 1991. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775 (1991). Questions remain whether Article III jurisdiction contemplates a suit between a Tribe
as a Tribe against a State; whether Congress can grant federal courts the jurisdiction to entertain
such suit; whether Article IIImay be read to allow States to subject themselves to federal court
jurisdiction; and several variations regarding sovereign immunity of the States. These issues are
discussed in Richard A. Monette, When Tribes Sue States: How Federal Indian Law Offers an
Opportunity to Clarify Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 14 QUINNEPAC L. REV. 401 (1994).
106. See e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 234 (Robert Clinton et al., eds.,
1991); DESKBOOK, supra note 57, at 9.
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in Cherokee Nation it seems the terms "Trust Relationship" and "Trust
Responsibility" have become hopelessly intertwined.07 It would not be
long before the questions of who held a discovery right, what was its
extent, and how Tribes became domestic, would again come before the
Court.
4. Worcester v. Georgia
In the early 1830s, Georgia continued its attempt to impose State laws
on Cherokee and those doing business with them. In Worcester v. Georgia,
the Supreme Court ruled that, via the Commerce Clause, the States
granted the Union the exclusive power to deal with Tribes. 08 In explaining
the extent of that right Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
It regulated the right given by discovery among the European discoverers, but could not affect the rights of those already in possession,
either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery
made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to
purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of
the possessor to sell. 1' 9
In doing so, the Court made clear that "discovery," as a creature of
Euro-American law was a tool by which the European powers restricted
their own peoples' right to buy, not the Tribes' rights to sell. This
decision came after the holding in Johnson that even if an individual
purchased property from a Tribe, the title could not be sustained in this
country's courts. Moreover, Johnson also offered the proposition that a
Tribe could sell to another Tribe, or issue title to its own citizens, or
even to a non-citizen, or that one citizen could sell that title to another,
or to a non-citizen. The result is that the discovery doctrine was not a
wedge between two Tribes, or between a Tribe and its citizens, or between
two fellow citizens of the same Tribe, or even between a Tribe and nonIndians, except in U.S. courts.
In reaching its conclusion in Worcester, the Court relied heavily on
the treaty between the United States and the Tribe, with two lasting
effects-one being perhaps the most positive development in all of Indian
law and the other perhaps the most negative. First, the court's characterization of the relationship emerging from the treaty reflected the
federalism relationship between the Union and the States." 0 Second, and
more unfortunate, the Court invoked words of protection and forced
107. See, e.g.,

DESKBOOK, supra note 57, at 9.
Finally, implementation of such treaties or statutes by federal officials must be
consonant with the guardian-ward relationship referred to in Cherokee Nation, i.e.,
the federal government is charged with a trust responsibility in administering the
affairs of tribes and their members. Breach of that responsibility may be remedied
through injunctive relief or monetary damages.

Id.
108. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832) ("Under the Constitution, no State
can enter into any treaty; and it is believed that, since its adoption, no state, under its own authority,
has held a treaty with the Indians.").
109. Id. at 544.
110. Id. at 538, 540, 553, 581.
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"
allegiance owed between the Union and Tribes pursuant to the treaty. ,
Simply put, Union/State federalism would never sustain what has since
transpired under the rhetoric of protection and forced allegiance.
Despite Worcester's clarification of the confusion brought about by
Fletcher and Johnson, their combined mistaken rendition of discovery
that Tribes could not sell land and issue title, coupled with the myth
that Tribes had no concept of private property, has evolved today into
a persistent notion that Tribes cannot exercise governance over the private
property of their own citizens, let alone lands of non-citizens in their
territories. Today, shades of both doctrines of discovery survive: first,
11 2
that the United States holds unmitigated power over Tribes; and second,
that the United States is the successor in interests to all rights to deal
with the Tribes, and that it duly exercised those interests in treaties legally
valid to this day. The former smacks of tyranny; the latter of democracy.

The Allotment Era: The Wayward Doctrines of Discovery, Trust,
and So-Called "'Plenary Power" Justifying the General Allotment
Act
After Worcester v. Georgia, Indian law went through a period of slow
development. The Union's attention turned to issues of slavery, industrialization, and commerce. However, after the Civil War, the Nation's
attention once again turned to westward expansion and Indian tribes. In
1883, the Court handed down Ex Parte Crow Dog, holding that a
a murder
recognized Tribe had inherent and exclusive jurisdiction over
3 The Tribe
another."
against
committed by one of the Tribe's citizens
service." 4
sentenced the murderer to pay compensation and community
In response to this sentence, the United States Congress enacted the
Indian Major Crimes Act (IMCA), asserting federal court jurisdiction
over such crimes." 5
After the IMCA was enacted in 1886, an incident similar to that
underlying Crow Dog occurred and the federal government prosecuted
the crime under the new statute. In United States v. Kagama, the Supreme
Court upheld the IMCA, holding that California had no jurisdiction in
such matters." 6 However, the Court's reasoning invoked the protection
and forced allegiance rhetoric of Worcester. In what appears to be an
effort to sustain the Union's power over the Tribe (whose jurisdiction
was not at issue), the Court wrote:
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
C.

protection, and with it the power . . . The power of the General
Government ... is necessary to their protection . . . . 7

III. Id. at 547-48, 581.
112. Nell J. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS
L. J. 1215, 1241-53 (1980).
113. 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
114. Id.
115. Ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)).
116. 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
117. Id. at 384.
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Therefore, invoking what has become known as the "plenary power
doctrine," the Court seemed to suggest that the United States possessed
unmitigated power to govern the internal affairs of Tribes." 8 Although
the Court accurately invoked the early Marshall holdings that the Union
held exclusive power to deal with Tribes, the IMCA embodied the first
real assertion of United States power over Tribes and their internal affairs.
In other words, the Court resurrected the discovery-as-conquest mentality
of Johnson v. McIntosh rather than the democratic processes heralded
in Worcester v. Georgia which would have recognized the blatant infringement on the Tribes' inherent sovereignty over its internal affairs.
Shortly after Kagama, the United States, buoyed by a new and judicially
licensed power, imposed the General Allotment Act upon Tribes. The
result was an astounding loss of land by Tribes, an incomprehensible
system of private property in Indian Country, an almost insurmountable
mish-mash of ownership interest in any given parcel, a costly boondoggle
to the American taxpayer and a legacy of inconsistent law that continues
to the present.
PART III: TRUST RELATIONSHIP VERSUS TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY, OR DEMOCRACY MEETS PATERNALISM
To this day Indian law reflects the divergent doctrinal approaches
emanating from the Marshall cases. They illustrate the discovery-byconquest, plenary power approach often attributed to Johnson v. McIntosh
which has led to the mistaken notion that Indian Tribes cannot give title
and thus maintain their own property systems. However, today's discourse
and jurisprudence also struggles to engender the more enlightened approach when the United States recognized the Tribes' inherent sovereignty
and political processes reaching back to Worcester v. Georgia. Determining
which approach will prevail is uncertain.
A.

Development of Trust Doctrines in Indian Law
As might be expected, the GAA "trust" provision gave rise to a line
of cases culminating in the federal government's monetary liability for
mismanagement of individually-owned allotments." 9 In a somewhat strange
twist, a parallel line of cases adapted the GAA's obligation to individual
lands to lands held by the Tribe as a whole, imbuing the political-based
trust relationship with characteristics of the property-based trust responsibility. In 1919, in Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, the U.S. Supreme
Court enjoined the federal government's disposition of communal Pueblo
lands on the basis of the "guardianship."120 Shortly thereafter, in Cramer
v. United States, the Court voided a federal land patent to a non-Indian
118. 1 have opined elsewhere why I feel the "plenary power doctrine" is misunderstood in Indian
law jurisprudence and discourse. See Monette, supra note 12, at 663-66. Nevertheless, however
indefensible the plenary power doctrine was and is, in very real terms Tribes now confront a maze
of territorial and property problems that test the deepest understandings of sovereignty and democracy.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 228 (1983).
120. 249 U.S. 110, 113-14 (1919).
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2
for lands within a Tribe's territory nineteen years after the patent. , In
mis1935, the Court upheld a damage award to the Creek Nation for
22 Thus,
territory.
of
loss
a
in
resulted
that
boundaries
territorial
surveyed
a cause of action for Tribes also emerged based on a breach of trust
that did not necessarily or solely emanate from the General Allotment
Act.
The strangest twist, however, emerged from a 1942 case which heightened the tension between the Trust Relationship and the Trust Responsibility. In Seminole Nation v. United States, the Supreme Court declared
that a Tribe's members had a cause of action against the United States
officals when
for distributing treaty annuity payments to the Tribe's own
23
federal officials believed the money was being misused. Suddenly, this
notion of trust created a fiduciary obligation between the United States
and a Tribe's citizens, even in contravention of decisions made by the
Tribe's government. As a necessary result, the Secretary of the Interior
became responsible for overseeing and perhaps overturning decisions of
the Tribes' own government. Also as a necessary result, the Tribe's own
political processes and democratic government were stifled. This single
notion would have a lasting and deleterious impact on the Tribes' governance and on the government-to-government political relationship be4
tween the United States and Tribes. ,2 The next section provides a foreboding
example of this impact.

The American Indian Agriculture Resource Management Act
The American Indian Agriculture Resource Management Act (AIARMA)
25 Among its purposes was
was enacted in 1993 by the 103rd Congress.
to make agriculture in Indian Country more responsive to the political
processes of the Tribes.' 26 The legislative history of the Act reaches back
to the lasting divergence between the cant of conquest of Johnson v.
McIntosh and the struggle for enlightenment in Worcester v. Georgia,
illustrating the tension between the Trust Relationship and the Trust
B.

Responsibility.

27

1

Two bills, S.2977 and H.R. 5744, first introduced in the 102d Congress,
proposed to force the Secretary of the Interior to abide by tribal law
in administering agricultural lands within tribal territory. In a hearing
before the Senate Indian Committee, the DOI restated the express policy
of the bill in testimony: "Section 202, Indian Participation in Land

121. 261 U.S. 219, 224, 236 (1923).
122. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 106-08, 111 (1935).
123. 316 U.S. 286, 301-08 (1942).
124. Obviously not every aspect of the political-based trust relationship could provide a cause of
action for monetary damages. For example, the federal government provides education and health
benefits to Tribe citizens. Even if such benefits were attributable to treaty obligation, what would
constitute a breach? What standard of education or health would apply? And what if they are not
attributable to a specific treaty obligation?
125. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3745 (1994).
126. Id.§ 3702 (1994).
127. S. REP. No. 102-442 (accompanying S. 2977 (Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act
of 1992)), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).

Winter 19951

PRIVATE PROPERTY IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Management Activities, provides that unless 'prohibited by Federal law,
the Secretary shall comply with tribal laws pertaining to Indian agricultural
lands."" '1

2

1

In other words, Congress would invoke its government-to-

government relationship with Tribes by recognizing their governance in
this area. However, invoking its "trust responsibility," the Interior Department responded, "This section gives the tribes authority over the
management of both tribal and 'individual allotted lands' and takes away
the discretionary authority of the Secretary."'' 29 As the Department had
explained earlier in its testimony, "[tihis would require allotted land be
subject to community goals which would create a Fifth Amendment
taking, and also violate the United States' trust responsibility to individual
Indian landowners."130 In short, the DOI would use the "trust responsibility" as a wedge between the United States and a Tribe in their
government-to-government, political-based trust relationship and as a wedge
between a Tribe and its own citizens in the Tribe's own democratic
political processes. As the next section illustrates, Tribes are caught up
in the confusion.
C. A Fossil Named "Sue"
The federal government is not alone in muddying the property area
of Indian law; sometimes the Tribes share the blame. In 1990, a fossilized
Tyrannosaurus Rex (nicknamed "Sue") was discovered by a member of
an archeological team on a parcel of land situated within the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe's boundaries and held in trust for an individual citizen
of the Tribe pursuant to the GAA. Scientists paid the tribal citizen and
excavated and removed the fossil. Some time later, the United States
seized the fossil as evidence for a criminal investigation under federal
law. A flurry of litigation maneuvers ensued to determine the proper
custodian and owner of the fossil. The Eighth Circuit decided that the
GAA trust status of the land imposed a trust responsibility on the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior, the mechanics of which were spelled out in
certain statutes. 3 ' Specifically, such a sale required prior approval by the
Secretary. 112 Therefore, the sale was invalid and the United States' seizure
of the fossil was lawful.
However, most fascinating was a memorandum opinion handed down
by the Tribe's own court.'3 3 After the fossil's removal, the Tribe enacted
a law providing for forfeiture of items gained in violation of Tribe law.
The Tribe filed against its own citizen, the allottee-owner of the fossil,
and the scientist who purchased it, seeking forfeiture of the fossil. How-

128. Id. at 28.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 25.
131. See, Black Hills Institute of Geological Research v. United States, 12 F.3d 737, 742-43 (8th
Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 741.
133. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Williams, Memorandum Opinion issued by the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe Court, July 5, 1994 (on file with author).
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ever, the tribal court concluded that the forfeiture provision was without
effect because the Tribe's ordinance was not in force at the time of the
within the
removal. But the court missed the real bone of 3 contention
4
case: governance, not ownership, over the fossil.
The federal government seized the fossil not simply to assert ownership
but also to assert control.' However, the Tribe's own court could find
no common law or societal reasons to have exercised inherent "police
powers," even in the absence of a written law, in order to preserve and
6
protect the Tribe's cultural patrimony and heritage. 3 Rather than addressing the question that the Tribe's claim necessarily raised-governance
and regulatory authority over the fossil-the Tribe court satisfied itself
that, "as it pertains to ownership of the fossil, this case may have been
mooted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision . . . ." What
did the Eighth Circuit's opinion on ownership have to do with the Tribe's
assertion of governance over the fossil?
Therefore, the tribal courts themselves have become lost in the interplay
between territorial sovereignty and popular sovereignty, between territory
and property, between the concepts underlying a property-based trust
responsibility and a political-based trust relationship. The tribal court
should have found that the Tribe exercises governance over the individual
tribal member who owned the trust land, over the land within its territory
where the fossil was found, and over the fossil itself. It should have
reached such conclusions with or without a written ordinance. It should
to preserve
have based it decision on the Tribe's inherent police power
31 7
heritage.
and
patrimony
cultural
Tribe's
the
and protect
Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act-of 1982
The Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982 (SAWRSA)
brings all the issues raised above into one scenario. Preliminary indications
are that the federal government may return to Worcester's enlightened
approach of recognizing the sovereign power of Tribes in property matters.
Among other issues, SAWRSA purports to resolve several claims to water
within certain districts of the Tohono O'odham Nation, formerly the
Papago Tribe.3 However, a recent letter regarding SAWRSA from the
Department of the Interior Office of the Solicitor to Senator John McCain
D.

134. Perhaps a case not in the Indian law context best illustrates the confusion between ownership
and governing control. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982), the
Supreme Court wrote that "ownership" by a government is a "fiction expressive in legal shorthand
of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation
of an important resource." Thus, regarding Indian Tribes, ownership should be construed as the
greater right to govern.
135. If the federal government was so concerned that South Dakota would assert governance
over the fossil, imagine what its response would have been if the Indian trust-land owner had sold
it to scientist in Brazil or China for their governments to control.
136. See supra note 23.
137. Ironically, the case could be read to illustrate that Tribes and Indians not only have a
concept of private property but also that they hold it in a very high regard.
138. Pub. L. No. 97-293, Title Ii, 96 Stat. 1274 (1982).
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tells the complete story. 31 9 "The key issue requiring resolution," according
to the letter, "is the nature of the rights in, and authority over, settlement
water enjoyed by the allottees and the Nation."' 4 Shortly below, the
letter states: "[Tihe Department has determined that it should, as trustee
for both the Nation and the allottees, provide some guidance on the
nature and extent of the rights held by each."'' 4'
It is interesting to note how the Department's issue takes into account
the distinction between owning ("rights in") and controlling ("authority
over") the water. However, presaging yet another instance where the
Department may wield the double-edged sword of the Trust Responsibility,
note that the Department invokes both its political relationship to the
Tribe and its obligations to the allottees.
Section 307(e) of SAWRSA exacerbates the matter by providing that
the SAWRSA's benefits inure "to all members of the Papago Tribe that
have a legal interest in lands of the [district]."1 42 The Department nibbled
at the bait, stating, "[a]lthough section 307(e) does not utilize the term
'allottees,' allottees are the only individuals having 'legal interest[s]
in
lands of the [district]."" 43 This excerpt, at first glance, seems to indicate
that the Department would succumb to the slippery slope.
Instead, the Department went a long way in bucking the trend. After
providing a factual and legal background, the Department explained, "a
tribe has the sovereign power to, among other things, regulate and perhaps
proscribe use of reservation resources, including allottee resources."' 44
The letter first took note of the confusion between ownership and control,
and then declared, "The Tribes' regulatory power is similar to that
possessed by states over appropriations of state 'owned' water.' '1 45 Unfortunately, the Solicitor could not completely relinquish his paternalistic
hold, construing an ambiguity in the statute in the Secretary's favor
instead of the Tribe's. He wrote, "But a tribe's regulatory authority is
circumscribed by . . . the Act. While section 7 does not directly address
tribal authority, it plainly makes the Secretary responsible for protecting
the allottees' interest in agricultural water use. Therefore, the Secretary
may . . . preempt tribal regulation that would thwart allottee interests."' 46
Thus, the Secretary's ability to wield the Trust Responsibility as a doubleedged sword to some uncertain degree survived.

139. Letter from John D. Leshy, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, to United States
Senator John McCain (Dec. 22, 1994) (on file with author).
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1282 (1982).
143. Letter from John D. Leshy to John McCain, supra note 139, at 4-5. While the non-allottee
citizens of the Tribe would beg to differ, fortunately the Department found the ambiguity to mean
only that the legislative history was inconclusive. Id. at 5.
144' Id. at 6 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
145. Id. at 8.
146. Id. Apparently this is so. As the Solicitor concedes, the section does not utilize the term
"allotees." Id.
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As a result, the confusion over territory and property, control and
ownership, continues. The Trust Responsibility owed to individual tribal
citizens may be wielded without warning against a Tribe attempting to
govern its own citizens and its property. The Trust concept becomes a
wedge between the United States and the Tribes in their government-togovernment relationship. Consequently, it also becomes a wedge between
a Tribe and its citizens in their democratic relationship. The Tribes
themselves, in their own courts, could take the lead in clarifying the
matter, but the confusion seems to have engulfed them as well.
PART IV:

THE ARGUMENT

Resolution of these issues will require nothing less than a strict adherence
to principles of federal republican democracy in a manner consistent with
other areas of law. Whereas the Union/State relationship generally emerged
from the Constitution, the Union/Tribe relationship generally emerged
from treaties. In an often cited statement, remarkably similar to the
Tenth Amendment in wording and logic, the Supreme Court once declared:
"In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians,
' 47
but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted.'
Indeed, a federative type of relationship has evolved between the Union
and the Tribes similar to that between the Union and States. In their
relationship with the Union, both States and Tribes invoke the positive
political theory of republican democracy; that is, their sovereignty begins
they are the grantors
with them, and that in any transfer of sovereignty
4
powers.
sovereign
of
and thus the reservers
The Supreme Court once addressed the very idea of allotments in the
context of the Winans/Tenth Amendment logic. The Court wrote,
To contend that the word 'allotted,' in reference to the land guaranteed
to the Indians in certain treaties, indicates a favor conferred rather
than a right acknowledged, would, it1 49would seem to me, do injustice
to the understanding of the parties.
If in the treaty context "allotment" should be construed as an acknowledgement of the Tribes' existing territorial rights, why in this context
should the word not be construed as acknowledging a right originating
in the Tribes? 50 The very same ideas underlie both circumstances. This
logic would support the notion that, although the United States directed
that Indian Country be allotted in severalty, it does not mean that the

147. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). See U.S. CONST. amend X. ("The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.")
148. See Monette, supra note 12.
149. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582.
150. After all, the paragraph with that quote begins, "The language used in treaties with the
Indian should never be construed to their prejudice." Id.
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allotments themselves originated from the United States. 5' Rather, like
the exchange of treaty territory, individual allotments were carved out
of that treaty-recognized territory and thus originated from the Tribes.
Therefore, the Tribes should be the primary governing authority over
the property systems that have emerged within their own territories due
to "allotments."
Nothing short of democracy is at stake. Democracy requires that the
Tribes and their own citizens are the source of the Tribe's sovereignty,
not Congress or the Secretary of the Interior. 5 2 Those individual Indians,
including those with allotments in trust or fee lands from allotments,
are citizens of a political entity. They may participate in its political
processes. At the very least, they avail themselves of rights, privileges,
and benefits incident to that polity. Along with those rights comes some
responsibilities, some sacrifices and some burdens. Not least among those
responsibilities, as in any democratic government, is to be informed, to
participate, and to strive for good government.
What precludes the federal government from raising the Trust Responsibility every time it feels that an individual Indian's interest is subject
to governance of the Tribe? Even if the federal government genuinely
believes that the Tribe's actions are unwarranted, if the government
precludes the action, when will the Tribe's political processes be exercised?
When will individuals be compelled to participate if they rest assured
that the federal government will inevitably intervene on their behalf?
Every wayward action by the Tribe, every disgruntled tribal citizen, every
little conflict that arises-plant the seeds that will bloom into the next
majority in the Tribe. These seeds are to utilize the electoral and other
participatory processes, to unite with other emerging majorities, to change
the Tribe's leadership-in short, to exercise democracy.
For example, in Anglo-American eyes, the pursuit and ownership of
property is a highly valued civil right, as demonstrated by DOI's reference
to the Fifth Amendment. In the Department's defense, if the Department
effected a taking, it could be compelled to provide just compensation.
If the Tribe effected a taking, nothing seems to guarantee that the
individual would be compensated. The federal Bill of Rights, including
the Fifth Amendment, does not apply to Tribes.' 5 3 The federal Indian
Civil Rights Act includes a "just compensation" provision, but it is
essentially unenforceable by federal courts. 5 4 However, the Tribe's- own
151. To suggest that allotments of Indian Country originated in the United States is, at best, to
invoke that tired mischaracterization of Johnson v. McIntosh that tribes cannot issue title and that
"all title stems from the sovereign," the United States. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying
text.
152. The Solicitor's letter begins by stating that "[tihe rights granted under SAWRSA
(emphasis added) yet he acknowledges that the Act settles Indian reserved water rights. Letter from
John D. Leshy to John McCain, supra note 139, at 1, 7. Thus, the Act had nothing to "grant."
Rather, read in light of Winans, the Tribe is the grantor, and thus the reservoir, in this equation.
This simple wording is critical to maintain the democratic logic that the Tribes and their are their
source of sovereignty.
153. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
154. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (construing 25 U.S.C. § 1301).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

constitution may prohibit takings, or may require compensation for 5tak6 If
ings.155 That is where the tribal citizen must seek primary recourse.
no recourse rests there, the citizen should use the Tribe's political processes
to place it there. That is the essence of democracy.
Finally, the Trust Responsibility was never intended to be a wedge
between the United States and the Tribes in their political relationship.
It should never be construed to interfere with the relationship between
the Tribe and its own citizens in their own democratic political processes.
President Bill Clinton, at a White House summit with Tribe leaders in
1994, recogniied that the federal government was using it as such a
wedge, instructing federal agencies to deal "directly and effectively with
tribal governments on activities that affect the trust property and/or
governmental rights of the tribes."' 57
Simply, the Trust Responsibility should be used as it originally developed
in the law. The entire history of the Trust Responsibility-from Discovery
and King George's Proclamation to the Commerce Clause and the Trade
and Intercourse Acts-proves that its intent was to keep non-Tribe, nonIndian entities from acquiring the Tribes' territory. Today, trust lands
or fractionated heirships resulting from the Allotment Acts continue to
fall into non-Indian hands. The Trust Responsibility should be invoked
to keep this diminishment from happening. Instead, the Trust Responsibility is invoked to keep Tribes themselves from accomplishing that
very objective.
Americans would be surprised to learn that the federal government
maintains a private property system just as their own States do. The
federal government maintains a property system for territory that in the
aggregate is almost the size of California. Maintaining such a system
comes with substantial administrative and transaction costs. Who bears
these costs? When tribal attempts to tax and regulate these lands are
thwarted, they cannot pay the costs. Therefore, the American taxpayer
bears these costs. An unaccountable federal bureaucracy does the work
and the American citizen foots the bill. Instead, Tribes should maintain
their own register of deeds. They should issue and record title. They
should assume all responsibilities for maintaining such systems, with all
the attendant recognized powers.
We must dispense with the myth that Tribes and Indians had no
concept of territory and private property. Then we should recite the
following three sentences. Tribes do not own property. Individuals own
property. Sovereigns hold dominion over territory. Tribes are sovereigns.

155. See supra note 55.
156. For example, the Constitution of the Ho-Chunk Nation requires that such cases be brought
in the Tribe's courts before in any other court. CONSTITUTION OF THE HO-CHUNK NATION, art. VII,
§ 5, cl. (a).
157. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951
(1994).

